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COMMENT
THE INCREASING CONTROL
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY THE
NLRB UNDER THE GOOD FAITH DUTY
The modes of bargaining in any context [including collective
bargaining] are infinitely varied and defy enclosure by metes and
)ounds, chains and links, or other aids to the precise establish-
ment of boundaries. They embrace bravado, false humility,
bluster and entreaty, exaggeration and deprecation. The process
itself places a premium on the appearance of strength (naturally,
the actual existence of it is to be preferred) and on the conceal-
ment of weakness .... Even unreasonableness, intransigence and
plain obduracy (or facsimilies thereof intended to convince the
other party to the bargaining that if reason is to prevail that other
must provide enough for two) have a part to play.
A bargain itself is the balance struck by the parties out of
their respective skills and strengths.1
Collective bargaining is like all other bargaining, except that the
duty to bargain is imposed by law. The Wagner Act 2 was originally
enacted to facilitate the organization of unions and to establish collec-
tive bargaining relationships between unions and employers.3 Section
8(a)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act requires an em-
ployer "to bargain collectively with the representatives of his em-
ployees. ' ' 4 The duty to bargain collectively is imposed on the unions by
section 8(b)(3) of the Act.5 Collective bargaining is described by
section 8(d) :
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agree-
ment, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of
a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if re-
quested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession .... 6
1 Benetar, The Boundaries of the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith Under the
N.L.R.B., 15 BAYLOR L. REv. 127 (1963).
249 Stat. 449 (1935). See Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Con-
cept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1941) for the history of §8(5)
of the Wagner Act.
3 Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REv. 389 (1950).
4 This section, numbered §8(5) in the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), was
renumbered §8(a) (5) by the Taft-Hartley Act (Labor Relations Management
Act) without other change, 61 Stat. 140 .(1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (5) (1964).
5 61 Stat. 141 (1947) 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (3) (1964). See Note, Union Refusal to
Bargain: Section 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 502 (1958).
661 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1964).
Traditionally, the National Labor Relations Board and the courts
have applied a subjective state-of-mind test to determine good faith.
Recently, the NLRB has added to the subjective test an objective test
which prescribes proper bargaining conduct. To complete the circle, the
Board has begun judging the reasonableness of the substantive positions
of the negotiating parties. This final step may result in the seating of
the NLRB at the negotiating table.
I. THE TRADITIONAL SUBJECTIVE TEST OF GOOD FAITH
The NLRB was mandated by Congress to enforce the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, thereby giving it some degree of control over
collective bargaining. The traditional test used to determine good faith
was a subjective test which determined the states of mind of the parties
involved.7 In NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,8 the parties held
seven conferences but the company rejected every proposal the union
made and refused to make any counterproposals. The range of dis-
agreement covered matters which normally would be settled in a routine
fashion (such as the union's request for a recognition clause), along
with more substantial questions of wages and union security. The
company also attempted to stall the negotiations. Based on that evidence,
the NLRB found that the company had failed to bargain in good faith.
The Ninth Circuit enforced the resulting order, saying that the duty
to bargain in good faith is an "obligation. . . to participate actively in
the deliberations so as to indicate a present intention to find a basis
for agreement. . . ." The parties must demonstrate an "open mind and
a sincere desire to reach an agreement" along with "a sincere effort...
to reach a common ground."9
This sincere desire to reach an agreement does not, however, require
that the parties "engage in fruitless marathon discussions at the expense
of frank statement and support of his position,"' 0 nor does the obliga-
tion to bargain "compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession."" Thus, the definition of good faith
bargaining as a sincere effort to reach an agreement, requires for com-
pletion the addition of the antinomy proposed by Professor Cox:
The employer (or union) must engage in negotiations with a
sincere desire to reach an agreement and must make an earnest
effort to reach common ground, but it need make no concessions
and may reject any terms it deems unacceptable.12
Rather than puzzle over that definition, it seems sufficient for a true
understanding of the duty to bargain in good faith to define bad faith
7Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401, 1414 (1959).
8 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).9 Id. at 686, quoting in part from NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118
F.2d 874, 885 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
20 NLRB v. American Natl Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
11LMRA §8(d), 61 Stat. -142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1966).
12 Cox, supra note 7, at 1419.
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rather than good faith. Bad faith is a "desire not to reach agreement"
with the other party.'3 The basic question in all cases is whether the
party acted like someone with a mind closed against agreement. 14
In determining whether a party has bargained in good faith, all
of the conduct of the parties is examined as evidence of his subjective
state of mind.1 5 This conduct must be viewed against the background
of the industry and the history of the relationship between the employer
and his employees.1 6 Many kinds of conduct have been found con-
vincing to establish bad faith with the weight of any one item usually
dependent on the circumstances of the particular case.
A party's state of mind may be revealed by his statements or
declarations which evidence bad faith.' 7 A party's outright refusal to
bargain with the other party to a collective bargaining relationship
certainly shows bad faith; however, this is usually characterized as
a failure to bargain which does not depend on a finding of good or
bad faith.'8
More frequently, the finding of bad faith results from an inference
based on the conduct of the party. Thus, while an employer may law-
fully demand an election and certification prior to bargaining where the
employer has a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status,19 the
employer may not use this demand in order to gain time to undermine
the union.20 An employer's failure to reply to a request to bargain
made by a certified union has been found to be evidence of bad faith."
"3 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 887 (1953).
14 Cox, supra note 7, at 1419.
15 NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1965); Sakrate, Inc.
332 R.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1964), enforcing, 140 N.L.R.B. 765, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 961 (1965), NLRB v. Cascade Employers Ass'n., Inc., 296 F.2d 42 (9th
Cir. 1961).
16 M. H. Birge & Sons Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 731 (1936).
17 NLRB v. Denton, 217 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1954); Continental Oil Co. v. NLRB,
113 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1940) ; Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 154
N.L.R.B. 101 (1965); Maurice Embroidery Works, Inc. 111 N.L.R.B. 1143(1955). Where company misrepresented to union that they should not confer
because the plant was to stay closed, when actually the plant was to be re-
opened, Oates Bros., Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1962). Where employer made
coercive statements, Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951). But see,
Frohman Mfg. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1308 (1954), where employer said he would
not bargain but obviously meant that he would not agree to the union's de-
mands.
:s NLRB v. Croh & Sons, 329 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1964) ; Triple AAA Water Co.,
148 N.L.RB. 1018 (1964).
19 Dazzo Products, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 182 (1964) ; Gilbert Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 2067(1954).
20 NLRB Daylight Grocery Co., 345 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1965), enforcing, 147
N.L.R.B. 733 (1964); Fleming & Sons, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1964); Bilin-
ski Sausage Mfg. Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 229 (1961).
21 NLRB v. Chain Service Restaurant, Lunchette & Soda Fountain Employees,
302 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1962); Pinella Paving Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1961);
Earl Saverin, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 86 (1950) ; Atlanta Journal Co., d.b.a. Radio
Station WSB, 82 N.L.R.B. 832 (1949). But see, NLRB v. Rural Electric Co.,
296 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1961) where request to bargain was evasively answered,
but by person with no experience in labor relations.
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Furthermore, the obligation to bargain is not fully satisfied by merely
inviting the union to submit written proposals where the union has
requested a personal conference.22
Even a willingness to meet does not preclude a finding of bad faith.23
Mere surface meeting and conferring does not satisfy the obligation to
bargain in good faith since there must be a bona fide attempt to come
to terms. 24 Nor does extensive and continuous bargaining over a long
period of time conclusively establish good faith.25 A bad faith finding
may be based on the showing of dilatory tactics: such as, delaying the
course of negotiations once begun ;26 sending a negotiator without any
authority ;27 or revoking the authority of a negotiator after an agree-
ment had finally been reached.28 Further evidence which might tend
to show a lack of good faith includes a sudden shift of position when
agreement is near,29 or the interjection of new issues after agreement
has apparently been reached.30 Any showing of interference, coercion
or restraint during the course of bargaining also indicates bad faith.3 1
The questions which have caused the greatest difficulty in determin-
ing subjective good faith are those which are based on the substantive
propositions advanced by the parties at the bargaining table. The prob-
lem is that it is difficult to determine bad faith without judging the
reasonableness of the proposals themselves. Thus, where the negotia-
tion centers around stereotyped clauses which any party would normally
find acceptable as a matter of course, a failure to agree can manifest
an intent not to agree.3 2 Furthermore, a bad faith finding may be based
22NLRB v. U.S. Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1953).23 oMajure d.b.a. Majure Transport Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 311 (1951).24NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1965) ; NLRB v.
Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943); Generac Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 980(1964); The Little Rock Downtowner, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1964), modi-fled, 341 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1965).
25 Woodruff, d.b.a. Atlanta Broadcasting Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 808 (1950).
26NL~RB v. W. R. Hall Distrib., 341 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Satilla
Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 322 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1963); Perry Publica-
tions, 151 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1965).27NLRB v. A. E. Nelleton Co., 241 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1957). But see, Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co. v. NLRB, 216 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1954), where negotiator
did not have authority to make binding commitment, but there was no viola-
tion.
28 Gitlin Bag Co., 196 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1952), enforcing, 95 N.L.R.B. 1159(1951).
29 Marley Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 919 (1965) ; Stanislaus Implement & Hardware Co.,
101 N.L.R.B. 394 (1952); Franklin Hosiery Mills, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 276 (1949).
But see, Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959), where employer legally
shifted position on two separate wage proposals because each proposal was
made in a different context.3oNLRB v. Altex Mfg. Co., 307 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1962); Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 878 (1965); Franklin Hosiery Mills, 83 N.L.R.B. 276(1949).
31 NLRB v. Lettie Lee, Inc., 140 F2d 243 (9th Cir. 1944) ; NLRB v. Dixie Motor
Coach Corp., 128 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1942).32 Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850, enforced, 205 F.2d 131 (Ist Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); Crow-Burlingame Co., 94 N.L.R.B.
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upon a failure to agree on trivial matters such as the union's use of a
plant bulletin board.33 As judge Magruder said:
[I] f an employer can find nothing whatever to agree to in an
ordinary current-day contract submitted to him, or in some of
the union's related minor requests ... this is at least some evi-
dence of bad faith ... [T]he employer is obliged to make some
reasonable effort in some direction to compose his differences
with the union, if §8(a) (5) is to be read as imposing any sub-
stantial obligation at all.
34
Good faith should be manifested by a willingness to make some offer
or counterproposal on some subject on which the parties might come
to agreement. 35
The conduct of the parties outside the bargaining room may also
show bad faith. The duty to bargain does not, however, exclude one
party from using economic pressure to force the other party to agree
to its bargaining demands. In the Insurance Agents' case, 3 the Supreme
Court held that the NLRB could not base a finding of bad faith bar-
gaining on the fact that the union had organized various on the job
slow-down tactics in order to put economic pressure on the employer
to submit to the bargaining demands of the union. Even though this
conduct was not protected union activity, it could not be used to show a
failure to bargain in good faith. The Court indicated that in its view
collective bargaining was to be largely free from the imposition of the
rule of law:
The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual
exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the
system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized.
Abstract logical analysis might find inconsistency between the
command of the statute to negotiate toward an agreement in good
faith and the legitimacy of the use of economic weapons, fre-
quently having the most serious effect upon individual workers
and productive enterprises, to induce one party to come to the
terms desired by the other. But the truth of the matter is that
at the present statutory stage of our national labor relations
policy, the two factors-necessity for good-faith bargaining
between parties, and the availability of economic pressure devices
to each to make the other party inclined to agree on one's terms
-- exist side by side.3
7
991 (1951); Montgomery Ward & Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 100 (1941), enforced, 133
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
3 Montgomery Ward & Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1950).
34 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (1st Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
35 See California Girl, 129 N.L.R.B. 209 (1960), which required a "potentiality
for yielding." But see, Harcourt & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 892 (1952) ; Collins Baking
Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 895 (1950), where failure to make a counterproposal was not
sufficient to show bad faith.
36 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
3 Id. at 489.
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In Crestline Co.,38 the employer unilaterally discontinued contribu-
tions for its employees' insurance plan and suspended all holiday pay
while bargaining for a new contract after the previous one had expired.
The employer attempted to explain the unilateral action as merely the
exercise of economic pressure to force the union to agree to its terms.
The NLRB distinguished Insurance Agents' and found the unilateral
changes to be violative of the Act because they amounted to a deliberate
refusal to bargain on mandatory subjects of bargaining. An employer
may, however, use a lockout to exercise economic pressure for accep-
tance of its terms after an impasse has been reached in negotiations. 39
But a lockout may be illegal when it is combined with other illegal
conduct as part of a plan to undermine a union.40
Some conduct amounts to a per se violation of the Act. The refusal
to sign a written agreement has always been regarded as such a strong
indication of bad faith as to be a per se violation because such a re-
fusal to sign is a negation of the idea of collective bargaining; i.e., it
amounts to a denial of joint participation in the culminating act of
bargaining-the promulgation of the written agreement.4' The employ-
er's denial of a union request for certain information also has been
held to be a per se violation of the Act. Thus a failure to disclose sucl
things as individual earnings,42 job rates and classifications, 3 merit
wage increases," pension data,45 time-study information," the operation
of incentive pay systems,4 7 and piece rates43 violates the Act, because
without such information, the union would be unable to bargain on
matters which constitute mandatory subjects of negotiation. Failure to
disclose such information amounts to a refusal to bargain.49
It is also a per se violation for the employer (or union) 50 to uni-
laterally make changes in wages, hours or conditions of employment
38 133 N.L.R.B. 256 (1961). Parties may bargain to impasse on mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining: NLRB v. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Fibreboard
v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Allen Bradley Co. v. NLRB, 286 F.2d 442
(7th Cir. 1961).39 American Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).40 American Stores Packing Co., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 3 CCH LAB. L. REP. 20,
384 (1966) which is a supplemental decision following the order of 351 F.2d
308 (10th Cir. 1965) to examine the case in light of the American Ship Bldg.
case.
41 NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940). The require-
ment that parties sign a written agreement was included in the duty to bargain
in §8(d) of the Act. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1966). See also,
Cox, supra note 7, at 1423.
42NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (1956)) (Per Curiam).
43Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955).
44NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.).
45Pep Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
46NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953).
47Dixie Mfg. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 645 (1948), enforced, 180 F2d 173 (6th Cir. 1950).
48 Vanette Hosiery Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1948).
49Cox, .supra note 7, at 1428.50 The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,
496-97 N.28 (1960), left open the question of a union's attempt to unilaterally
change working conditions.
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while negotiations are going on without first consulting the other party.
In NLRB v. Katz,51 the employer, during the course of negotiation,
gave automatic wage increases which were greater than the increases
offered by the company at the bargaining table. The Supreme Court
held that the Board could find a failure of the duty to bargain without
a finding of over-all subjective bad faith because the institution of these
changes amounted to refusals to bargain over questions which were
mandatory subjects of bargaining.52
In summary, all of these violations-the refusal to sign a written
agreement, the denial of requested information regarding certain man-
datory subjects of bargaining and the institution of unilateral changes
in mandatory subjects of bargaining-are per se violations because they
constitute refusals to bargain rather than failures to bargain in good
faith. Designating these situations as constituting bad faith seems to
be a confusion. 3
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE OBJECTIVE MODEL OF BARGAINING
The confusion between refusal to bargain and bad faith bargaining
formed the springboard which the NLRB used to add an objective
standard of good faith to the traditional subjective test. By the use
of this objective standard, the Board has undertaken to regulate the
manner in which bargaining is conducted regardless of the party's state
of mind.5
4
In Truitt Mfg. Co.,55 the Board extended the per se violation ap-
proach, used in refusal to bargain situations, to situations where an
employer refused to give financial data after denying a union wage
demand on the grounds of inability to pay even though the refusal did
not in itself constitute a refusal to bargain on wages. The employer
offered a two-and-a-half cents-an-hour wage increase which was re-
jected by the union because it claimed that the company could afford a
ten-cents-an-hour increase. Truitt then rejected a union request to have
a certified public accountant examine the company books on the grounds
that such information was confidential and not a matter for discussion
with the union. The NLRB found that this refusal to disclose amounted
to an unfair labor practice because:
. . . it is settled law, that when an employer seeks to justify
the refusal of a wage increase upon an economic basis . . .
good-faith bargaining under the Act requires that upon request
51369 U.S.. 736 (1962). See also, NLRB v. National Shoes, Inc., 208 F.2d 688(2d Cir. 1953); Stanislaus Implement & Hardware Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 394
1952), enforced, 226 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1955).5 2 This conclusion may be rebutted by showing that there was a need for immedi-
ate action or that the negotiations had reached an impasse.
53 Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401, 1428 (1959).
54 Id. at 1430.
55 Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954), enforcement denied, 224 F.2d 869(4th Cir. 1955), revd, 351"U.S. 149 (1956).
[Vol. 50
the employer attempt to substantiate its economic position by
reasonable proof.56 (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court eventually upheld the NLRB decision. Professor
Cox analyzed the Court's descision and concluded that Justice Black
had "evaded every issue." 57 The Truitt case is unsatisfactory under the
subjective state-of-mind test because there had been no factual finding
of subjective bad faith. Rather, the Board and the Supreme Court relied
for its finding on a settled rule of law, i.e., an objective standard.
Furthermore, the withholding of financial data necessary to prove in-
ability to pay could have been prompted by many considerations other
than bad faith,58 so that it would seem impossible to base a finding of
bad faith on the refusal alone. Thus, an objective standard was promul-
gated to govern the disclosure of requested financial data when the
company has denied a wage proposal because of financial inability to
pay.5 9 It is a standard of conduct imposed on all parties to collective
bargaining regardless of the states of mind of the parties. While it is
not unreasonable to maintain that it is unfair or undesirable for an
employer to base his denial of a wage demand on information peculiarly
within his own knowledge, the imposition of an objective standard
proscribing such conduct does place a restriction on the essentially free
nature of collective bargaining.
The Board has also attempted to establish a similar objective stand-
ard where a party uses economic pressure during negotiations to force
the other party to accede to its terms.60 As was discussed above, this
attempt has been rejected by the Supreme Court in the Insurance
Agents' case.6'
The NLRB seems not to have changed its basic approach since
Insurance Agents', but rather it has continued to extend its control of
the bargaining methods of parties negotiating labor contracts. In Gen-
eral Electric Co.,62 the company eschewed all traditional bargaining
sG Id. at 856.
57 Cox, supra note 53, at 1432.58For example, the company may have feared that disclosure might impair the
company's credit or give a competitor some advantage.
-59 See also, International Telephone & Teleg. Corp., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 5
CCH LAE. L. RE. §20,642 (1966), which required the employer to document
a plea that its competitive position would be adversely affected by a wage in-
crease. But see, American Sanitary Wipers Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 5 CCH
LAB. L. REP. §20, 295 where employer admitted he could pay higher wages
but where he would not give a wage increase because he could get all the labor
he needed at the existing scale, held, no violation.
60 Textile Workers (the Personal Pioducts case), 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954),
enforced in. part, set aside in part, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 864 (1956); United Mine Workers (The Boonie County case), 117
N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957); and Insurance Agents' Int'l. Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768(1957).
61 NLRB v. Insurance Agent's Int'l. Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). See supra notes
36-37, and accompanying text.
62 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Second
Circuit on the issue of a successful party's right to intervene in Court of
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techniques and adopted a bargaining system know as "Boulwareism."
The purpose of this new bargaining system was to avoid management
cave-ins at the bargaining table under strike threats by the union. The
company attempted to avoid such cave-ins and to strengthen its bar-
gaining position by convincing the public and its employees that the
company would voluntarily offer the best possible contract at the outset
of negotiations without requiring the union to extract each benefit from
a recalcitrant management. In order to instill the attitude that G.E.
would "do right by its employees," the company employed marketing
methods which had been found successful in the sale of the company's
consumer products. To establish the best possible contract, G.E. made
an extensive economic survey in order to determine what the company
could afford to offer, as well as a study to find which economic benefits
and psychological satisfactions were most important to its employees.
When negotiations began the union presented its proposals for the
new contract. The company listened to the union offer without respond-
ing to it. G.E. then geared the union proposal in with all of the other
information which had been gathered. Based on this wealth of data, the
company made its offer to the union. The company stated that this
proposal was the best it would give and that, unless the union could
present new information which would show that the company offer
was not based on accurate information, the company would not accept
any modifications. To further strengthen its bargaining position, G.E.
announced that it would not give in even if the union went out on strike.
As an integral part of its overall bargaining system, G.E. used ad-
vertising techniques in a communications program designed to "sell"
the employees on the merits of the company's offer and to denigrate
the union's offer, bargaining approach and leadership. Circulars, com-
pany newspapers, an intensive personal contact program between super-
visors and employees and other media were used to fully publicize
every aspect of the company offer including the company position that
it would not modify its offer without good reason.
After a 21 day strike failed, the union settled essentially upon the
terms of G.E.'s offer, though the agreement contained some modifica-
tions of the original company offer. The union then filed charges with
the NLRB claiming that the Boulware bargaining system was illegal.
The rationale underlying Boulwareism seems to be that because
the company had gathered such complete information covering every
facet of the bargaining relationship and had based its offer on that data,
the proposal made by the company was fully documented as the best
possible offer. Furthermore, G.E.'s offer and the information on which
Appeals review proceedings. Sub. norn. ,Iternational Union v .NLRB, 382
U.S. 366, 15 L. Ed.2d 420, 86 Sup. Ct. 528 (1966) (Per Curiam).
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it was based formed good reason for denying the union's original offer G3
as well as any subsequent union proposal unless that proposal would
be based on information which was more accurate than the information
used by the company. 64 Although one side had presented most of the
revelant information on which negotiations were conducted, the bar-
gaining itself was a rational process of persuasion because every pro-
posal and counterproposal was based on accurate data of the labor-
management relationship.65
The NLRR, however, viewed Boulwareism as a whole and con-
cluded that it constituted a failure to bargain in good faith.6 6 This
conclusion was made without any finding of a subjective bad faith, but
in light of a conceded intent on the part of the company to reach agree-
ment with the union. The Board reasoned that the company had at-
tempted to bypass and undermine the union as bargaining agent by
advancing and publicizing its "fair and firm" offer. This combination
of G.E.'s fixed position at the bargaining table coupled with the com-
munication campaign placed the company "in a position where it could
not give unfettered consideration to the merits of any proposal the
Union might offer."67 The position of the union thereby was demeaned
to that of an advisor, rather than a full joint participant in the bargain-
ing process. Thus, the company was precluded by its bargaining system
from taking any of the union proposals seriously. After characterizing
the bargaining conduct as bespeaking a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude, the
Board concluded that:
a party who enters into bargaining negotiations with a "take-it-
or-leave-it" attitude, violates its duty to bargain although it goes
63 This would satisfy the requirement that reasons must be given for proposals
offered and refused. See NLRB v. Yutana Barge Lines, Inc., 315 F.2d 524,
530 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Grinnell Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1334 (1965); Roy Hanson, 137
N.L.R.B. 251 (1962).
64 Furthermore, G.E. still was open to change its offer but only if its proposal
was refuted by better information supplied by the union. See, United Clay
Mines Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1368 (1953), enforcement denied, 249 F.2d 120 (6th
Cir. 1955).
c5 Professor Cox enunciated four purposes for the original §8(5) of the Wagner
Act. The first purpose was to reduce the number of strikes which had been
caused by the outright refusal of employers to deal with unions. The second
purpose was to create aggregations of economic power for the employee to
countervail the existing power of employers to establish conditions of employ-
ment. Cox further described two purposes which were not written into the
Wagner Act but which framed the development of collective bargaining which
was hoped for at the time of the passage of the Wagner Act. The first was
the development of true joint participation in the establishment of wages,
hours and conditions of employment. The second goal was that the parties
would come to look upon collective bargaining as a rational process of per-
suasion whereby prejudices would be forgotten and where each party would
attempt to find the actual joint needs of both parties. Hopefully such an atti-
tude by both parties would lead to such general agreement over the widegamut of issues that compromise would become the only reasonable course
for the few disputed issues. Cox, supra note 53, at 1407.66 General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 197 (1964).
67 Id. at 195-196.
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through the forms of bargaining, does not insist on any illegal or
nonmandatory bargaining proposals, and wants to sign an agree-
ment.68
Because of the combination of take-it-or-leave-it bargaining and the
public statement by the company that it would not change its position,
the case may be so unusual as to be restricted to its facts. Therefore,
the General Electric case may not, of itself, establish give-and-take
bargaining as an objective element of the NLRB's bargaining structure.
However, subsequent cases seem to indicate that parties to collective
bargaining must use give-and-take bargaining.
In Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.,69 which distinguishes the General
Electric case, the employer insisted to impasse that the labor contract
should contain a management rights clause which would give the
company exclusive control over job classifications and subcontracting
and that the arbitration clause should limit arbitration to the express
terms of the contract. As a part of its bargaining program, the company
initiated a communication program to give full information on the
status of negotiations, to explain the company's position, to refute in-
flammatory union charges, and to criticize the bargaining strategy and
tactics of the union leadership. In distinguishing the situation from the
General Electric case, the NLRB stated that while communicating in
non-coercive terms with employees during 'collective bargaining nego-
tiations was not a per se violation of section 8(a) (5), a non-coercive
communication campaign could be utilized as an effective instrument
to bypass the union. As an example, the Board cited General Electric,
as a situation in which the company illegally used a non-coercive com-
munications program to bypass the union by communicating its refusal
to engage the union in meaningful give-and-take bargaining with respect
to its "fair and firm" nonnegotiable contract proposal. The NLRB found
that the communication program of Proctor & Gamble was not illegal
because there had been give-and-take bargaining with extension discus-
sions, proposals, counterproposals and concessions.
It seems clear from a comparison of Proctor & Gamble and General
Electric, that the one basis of the finding of bad faith in General Elec-
tric was the failure of the company 'to practice give-and-take bargaining.
The only thing wrong with G.E.'s communication program was that
it had publicized and thereby reinforced the "take-it-or-leave-it" atti-
tude of the company before there had been any real bargaining between
the parties.
Recent cases in which negotiations have reached an impasse without
any finding of bad faith further establish give-and-take bargaining as a
necessary element of any bargaining system. In Intercontinental Engi-
68 Id. at 194.
69 160 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. §20, 672 (1966).
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neering & Mfg. Co.,70 an impasse was reached over union security and
wages. The Trial Examiner, who was affirmed by the Board, found
that there had been no violation of the duty to bargain in good faith
... where there has been an open exchange of ideas, proposals,
and counterproposals, and an indication of willingness to com-
promise [the parties] cannot be found to have violated Section
8(a) (5) of the Act simply because on some issues, even though
they may be crucial, one or the other of the parties has been
unwilling to recede from its position so as to yield to the conten-
tion or demands of the other.71
However, in East Texas Steel Casting Co.,7 2 the parties exchanged
several proposals and counterproposals, but the company remained
adament on all major economic questions. The Board concluded that the
company was not using proper give-and-take bargaining procedure
because its change of position was only minimal.
Therefore, give-and-take bargaining required by the General Electric
case does not preclude a party from holding a firm position on some
issues from the beginning of negotiations, nor does the case prevent a
party, who has used give-and-take bargaining during negotiations,
from eventually coming to a firm proposal covering every issue. As
long as there has been the open exchange of ideas and as long as
proposals and counterproposals have been made during negotiations,
there will not be a finding of bad faith even though there has been hard
bargairiing on some of the issues from the beginning of negotiations.
By issuing its firm all-encompassing proposal before any real
negotiations began, by publicizing it as the final offer, and by attempting
to establish in the minds of its employees that the company was the
true protector of the employees, G.E. was effectively saying that the
union was not necessary. This amounted to a denial that agreement to
a labor contract was essentially a collective process between the union
and management. The Board characterized G.E.'s conduct as an attempt
to disparage the union and concluded:
It is inconsistent with this obligation [to deal with the em-
ployees' representative] for an employer to mount a campaign,
as Respondent did, both before and during negotiations, for the
purpose of disparaging and discrediting the statutory representa-
tive in the eyes of the employee constituents . . . and to create
70 151 N.L.R.B. 1441 (1965). See also Rangaire Corp., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 5
CCH LAB. L. REP. §20, 274 (1966); Grinnell Co., Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 1334
(1965).
71 Id. at 1446.
72 154 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1965). See also, Capitol Aviation, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 745
(1965), enforcement denied, 355 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1966) ; Weinacher Broth-
ers, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 459 (1965). But see, Jack Lipsitz, d.b.a. American
Sanitary Wipers Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. §20, 295(1966), where the employer never deviated from his original position on any
economic issue but the Board held that this would not per se establish bad
faith bargaining.
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the impression that the employer rather than the union is the
true protector of the employees' interests."
This duty not to disparage is based on the duty of an employer to
recognize the statutory representative and to bargain collectively with
that representative rather than with the individual employees.7 4
III. THE JUDGEMENT OF THE REASONABLENESS OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROPOSALS
The duty not to disparage the union has taken a strange twist since
the General Eletcric case. In H. K. Porter Co., Inc.,75 the employer
refused to concede to a checkoff clause on the ground that he did not
want to aid in the union's business of collecting dues. The Trial Exam-
iner followed the language from the General Electric case:
it is inconsistent with the bargaining obligation which the
Act imposes upon an employer for the latter to conduct negotia-
tions with the statutory representative in such a manner as to
disparage or discredit the statutory representative in the eyes
of its employee constituents.78
The Trial Examiner then reasoned that since the Act requires an em-
ployer to give some aid and comfort to the union by dealing with it
as representative, the employer could not deny checkoff on the ground
that he did not want to give aid to the union. Thus, the NLRB exam-
ined the reasons the employer gave for his position and found them
to be unsatisfactory. Because of this, the employer was found to have
violated his duty to bargain in good faith.
In another case dealing with hard bargaining on checkoff, Roanoke
Iron & Bridge Works, Inc.,7 the Board again found that the employer's
denial of a checkoff was unreasonable and that, as a result, the employer
had bargained in bad faith. In 1951, the Steelworkers were certified.
In the ensuing negotiations the company successfully refused checkoff.
By the time the first contract expired, the union had withered so that
no new contract was ever negotiated. The Steelworkers were again
certified in 1964, and again the company refused checkoff. The com-
pany, as a part of its bargaining program, distributed literature which
cited the 1951 refusal of checkoff and the falling away of union mem-
bers "when they found out they did not need a union."
The Trial Examiner, who was affirmed by the Board, found that
7 General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 195 (1964).
74 Id. at 194. 1.... the duty of management to bargain in good faith is essentially
a corollary of its duty to recognize the union." NLRB v. Insurance Agents'
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 484-485 (1960).
75 153 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1965), enforced 363 F.2d 272, cert. denied, - U.S.
,87 Sup. Ct. 40 (1966).
76 Id. at 1373.
77 160 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 5 CCH LAa. L. REP. §20, 652 (1966). See also, Farmers
Coop. Gin Ass'n., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. §20, 876 (1967).
The Board is especially suspicious of any employer who refuses checkoff but
who does make other payroll deductions for government bonds, charities, etc.
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the company had refused checkoff in the belief that without checkoff
the union would again leave the scene. He reasoned that:
Where an employer takes a position in bargaining, not to ad-
vance his own economic interest or to safeguard the rights or
interests of his employees, but for the purpose of damaging or
destroying the union with which he is bargaining, then he is not
bargaining in good faith. This is not to say that the employer
must grant a union's demands which do not appear harmful to
the employer, but only to say that the employer's motives and
objectives must be legitimate, and the principle on which he
stands must be permissable under the statute (e.g., an unwill-
ingness to prefer the union over other creditors of his employ-
ees), not as here, the impermissible object of harm to the other
party.7 8
As the dissent in Roanoke points out, there had been no showing
of an intent not to agree; the parties had negotiated the checkoff issue;
each party had made proposals and counterproposals; and the parties
had been able to reach agreement on every other issue. The only basis for
the bad faith finding was the Board's judgment of the reasonableness
of the employer's position on the checkoff issue. The test used to deter-
mine whether the position was reasonable was whether the object of
the position was to harm the other party.
The Board did not, however, make acceptance of checkoff an ele-
ment of the objective standard. Thus in Truitt the Board did not judge
the reasonableness of refusing to open the company books to the union,
but just proscribed such a refusal after the denial of a wage demand
because of financial inability."h In Roanoke, however, the Board looked
into the reason for denying checkoff to see if the denial was based on
an intent to harm the other party.
There appear to be three grounds by which checkoff can be denied:
First, that checkoff would be too costly. This ground would seem
questionable where the payroll is figured by computer. Second, that
checkoff would work against the interest of the employees. For example,
an employer might deny checkoff where his employees would be denied
membership in a professional association because of union membership.
The third ground, which predictably will be used most often, is an
unwillingness on the part of an employer to favor the union over other
creditors of his employees.
One problem with Roanoke is whether the "object of harm to the
other party" test will be extended to judge the substantive positions of
bargaining parties on issues other than checkoff. For example, if a
union staked its future existence on getting wages doubled, would a
company denial be judged to be for the object of harming the union?
78 Ibid.
7 Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954). See supra notes 55-59, and accom-
panying text.
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If the test were applied to union bargaining positions, would a union
be found to be in bad faith for pushing for higher wages after the
company showed that it would have to go out of business if it granted
any increase? The reasoning in Roanoke does not seem to limit appli-
cation of the object of harm test to the question of checkoff.
Another problem is what "harm" really means. In Roanoke "harm"
was limited to where the employer foresaw the withering of the union.
In H. K. Porter there was only a showing of strong anti-union feeling.
The real question emanating from these cases is how the NLRB will
distinguish the object of a party's position to harm the other party from
an attempt to bargain for the strongest possible bargaining position,
vis-a-vis the other party.
Potentially, this test could be expanded to allow the Board to judge
every position taken by bargaining parties. This would place the NLRB
directly at the bargaining table in a position to impose by rule of law
whatever contract provisions it finds desirable.
IV. CONCLUSION
If good collective bargaining requires that the parties be basically
free to come to their own agreement, it is questionable whether such
continued expansion of NLRB control of collective bargaining is de-
sirable. The effect of using an objective standard to judge bargaining
procedures is to preclude the development of any new techniques. Today
the traditional bargaining practices are under attack as inadequate to
meet the demands of present society.80 Perhaps a more flexible approach
by the NLRB would allow the parties to develop more efficient bargain-
ing techniques.
MICHAEL J. ZIMfMER
80 See e.g., Blum, Collective Bargaining: Ritual or Reality?, 39 HARV. Bus. REV.
63 (1961); Cox, The Uses and Abuses of Union Power, 35 NOTRE DAME LAW.
624 (1966) ; Wallich, Can We Stop Inflationary Wage Increases?, 40 HARV.
Bus. REV. 6 (1962).
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